MONETARY POLICY REGIMES, EXPECTED INFLATION, AND THE RESPONSE OF INTEREST RATES TO MONEY ANNOUNCEMENTS
V. Vance Roley and Carl E. Walsh* Recent studies on the response of interest rates to weekly money announcements reveal several interesting empirical relationships. First, the empirical results of Berkman (1978) , Grossman (1981) , and Urich and Wachtel (1981) indicate that Treasury bill yields rise (fall) in response to an unanticipated increase (decrease) in the announced money stock.-Second, Roley (1982 and Cornell (1983) find that the magnitude of the bill-yield response increased following the Federal Reserve's announced change in operating procedures on October 6, 1979. Third, Cornell (1983) One hypothesis relies on studies by Fama (1975) and Nelson and Schwert (1977) , among others, who estimate that changes in expected inflation account for most of the fluctuations in nominal interest rates.-1 Under this hypothesis,
-2-a positive surprise in a weekly money announcement that is not expected to be offset totally by the Federal Reserve leads to an increase in expected inflation. Thus, the increased interest-rate response following the change in operating procedures in October 1979 is interpreted as evidence that the Federal Reserve is less committed to monetary control. Moreover, the significant response of long-term interest rates in both the pre-and post-October 1979 periods is interpreted as reflecting changes only in expected inflation [e.g., Cornell (1983) and Hardouvelis (1982) ].
The other hypothesis is based on a policy anticipations effect. Under this hypothesis, market participants are assumed not to revise their expectation about future inflation on the basis of any one-week's money surprise. Instead, the Federal Reserve is assumed to offset at least partially any deviation in money from its target. A positive money surprise would then imply a rise in expected future interest rates in anticipation of policy actions designed to bring the money stock back to target. This paradigm, therefore, suggests that real interest rates change in response to unanticipated announced changes in money. Thus, in contrast to the expected inflation hypothesis, the increased interest-rate response after October 1979 is consistent with a greater desire by the Federal Reserve to control money along with other possible effects related more closely to the change in operating procedures itself [e.g., Roley (1982 and Walsh (1983) ]. Evidence supporting the policy anticipations hypothesis is presented by Cornell (1982) and Engel and Frankel (1982) who find, in the context of the foreign exchange market, that the dollar appreciates in response to a positive surprise in announced money. ' However, both Cornell (1983) and Hardouvelis (1982) claim that the response of long-term interest rates Is too large to be explained by this effect.
The purpose of this paper is to specify separate models consistent with the policy anticipations and expected inflation effects, respectively, and to compare their implications for interest rate responses over the entire term structure. The increased response of interest rates after October 1979 and the relatively large response of long-term rates are shown to be consistent with the policy anticipations effect. In particular, these phenomena can be explained by the Federal Reserve's change in operating procedures, the degree of short-run monetary control, and the persistence of money demand shocks.
Other models of the policy anticipations effect do not include long-term interest rates, and they selectively ignore such important institutional features as the type of operating procedures used by the Federal Reserve, lagged reserve accounting, and the lag in money announcements [e.g., Urich (1982) and Nichols, Small, and Webster (1983) ]. This institutional detail plays a key role in the models considered here.
In the first section of this paper, the response of the term structure of interest rates in the pre-and post-October 1979 periods is estimated.
The policy anticipations and the expected inflation models are presented in the second and third sections, respectively. In the fourth section, the empirical results are reconciled with the predictions of both models, and additional empirical evidence on the relative merits of the two models is discussed. The main conclusions are summarized in the final section.
I. Estimated Response of Interest Rates
In this section, the response of the term structure of interest rates in the pre-and post-October 1979 periods is estimated. The empirical results exhibit both the increase responsiveness since October 1979 and the relatively large response of long-term yields. These results are presented following brief discussions of the specification and data used in the estimation.
Specification
The usual efficient markets approach is adopted to estimate the response of interest rates to weekly money announcements. To conform with the theoretical models presented in subsequent sections, the consequences of the efficient markets hypothesis may be represented as
where Rt = change in the interest rate over a time interval including the money stock announcement in week t = announced level of the money stock in week t = market's rational expectation of the announced level of the money stock in week t = random error term uncorrelated with any information available to the public prior to the money announcement in week t b0,b1 = estimated coefficients While a constant term is always included in the empirical specifications, it should equal zero under the null hypothesis of market efficiency and in the absence of systematic measurement error.
Data
All of the data described below are weekly and span the period beginning and post-October 1979 subsainples are presented in Table 1.-Within each subsample, the estimated response of Treasury security yields declines, with one exception, as maturity increases. In the pre-October 1979 subsample, for example, the 3-month Treasury bill yield is estimated to increase by about 6 1/2 basis points for a 1 percent announced money surprise, while the 20-year yield increases by about 1 basis point. Similarly, in the post-October 1979 subsample, the 3-month yield's response is over 2 1/2 times greater than that of the 20-year yield. Despite the lower estimated response of long-term yields, Cornell (1983) and Hardouvelis (1982) suggest that the response is nevertheless too large to be explained by the policy anticipations effect, especially in the post-October 1979 period. Instead, the expected inflation effect is hypothesized to account for the response of long-term yields.
The empirical results in Table 1 also Indicate that the estimated response for all maturities of Treasury securities is over five times larger In the postOctober 1979 period. In the last column, the equality of the response is formally tested, and In each case the null hypothesis can be rejected at less than the 1 percent level of significance) As mentioned earlier, these results are apparently consistent with two competing hypotheses. First, the response may have increased because of the change in Federal Reserve operating procedures and perhaps a somewhat greater commitment to monetary control [Roley (1982 and Walsh (1983) ]. Second, the larger response may reflect less desire to control money, implying larger changes in expected inflation for a given money surprise (Cornell (1983) and Hardouvelis (1982) ]. These empirical results are discussed further in the fourth section in the context of the two competing hypotheses. In this section, a model of the response of interest rates to money announcements is developed which focuses exclusively on the policy ariticipations effect. By ignoring the role of expected inflation, it will be possible to determine whether the policy anticipations explanation is, in isolation, consistent with the empirical results reported in Table 1 
Within this conceptual framework, consider the actions of the Federal
Reserve at the beginning of settlement week t. Assume, for simplicity, that in setting its policy instrument for week t, the Federal Reserve, but not yet the public, knows m2, the (log) money supply during week t-2. This is the number which will be announced on Friday of week t. The Federal Reserve cannot yet observe but on the basis of m2 (and perhaps other inforination), an estimate of week t-l s deviation from target, E(m1Ict) -is formed, where denotes the Federal Reserve's information set at the start of week t, E(m1Jc) is the expectation of ini conditional on and -9-is the target value for mi which had been set at the start of week t-l based on 2 .
The estimate of this deviation is used to revise the t-1 target path. The policy rule is assumed to be,
According to (2), a deviation from target during week t-l leads to a revised target path for money for all future weeks. Equation (2) The Federal Reserve has two potential policy instruments: the weekly average federal funds rate, i, or the weekly average path of (log) nonborrowed reserves, 1n1BR.-1 Dealing first with the pre-October 6, 1979 period, i will initially be treated as the tool used to implement policy.
Pre-October 1979 Qperat ing Procedures
Prior to October 1979, the Federal Reserve used in trying to equate money demand to the targeted quantity of money. It is assumed that money demand is given by -10-where Pt is the log of the price level and rt is the rate on an n-week security, such as a 13-week Treasury bill. The appearance of r in (3) captures the notion that the demand for money does not depend on the federal funds rate, but on a longer term interest rate. Income is treated as a constant for this analysis and is not explicitly included in (3). Since, in this section, Pt will be treated as a constant, it will be covenient to define cx = + Pt and write m =a-cr +u 
where is a white noise process.
An expectations model of the term structure of interest rates is used to link i and r . If 4' is defined as the information set available to the n-i = (1/n) E ÷÷); I = 0,... With a funds rate operating procedure, the Federal Reserve sets according to (7) at the beginning of the settlement week. Because i(c2) is based on t which includes information not available to the public prior to the Friday announcement, the public cannot distinguish the component parts in (7). Using the term structure equation (5), the appendix shows that r can be written as
Equation (8) shows explicitly how r depends on the public's expectations about the target path for the money supply.
In order to analyze the effects of the money announcement, it will be necessary to define more specifically the public's information set and relate it to the Federal Reserve's information set 
The money "surprise", the difference between the announcement on Friday and the public's expectation of in2, is just the week t-2 innovation in the money demand disturbance.
Making use of the policy rule (2), together with (8), it is possible to derive the adjustment in r which occurs in response to the announcement (details can be found in the appendix):
,n n j tAlthough the money surprise, 2' is itself direct information only on the week t-2 money demand innovation, its effect on r can be seen from (10) to consist of three components. The last term, c (l--n)1p/n < 0 is a Keynesian liquidity effect. To the extent that a positive deviation above target, for example, is partially accommodated < 1), the money supply will be permanently higher. Since the interest elasticity of the demand for money is negative, interest rates must fall.
The middle term in (10) The first term in (10), is negative since (l_X)hl < 1. The upward pressure on interest rates produced by a positive surprise is moderated to the extent that the Federal Reserve is expected to return in to the target path 15/ only gradually.-
The effect of the money announcement in this policy anticipations model on interest rates of longer maturity than rt can also easily be derived using the expectations model of the term structure. Let Rt be the rate on a security with rnn weeks to maturity. Then
k=0
Making use of some earlier results, it can be shown that
The first and second terms on the RHS of (12) Equations (10) and (12) give the response to the money announcement of both short-and long-term interest rates under a federal funds rate operating -14-procedure. On October 6, 1979, however, the Federal Reserve shifted to a nonborrowed reserves operating procedure. Such a procedure involves setting a path for rionborrowed reserves which is consistent with achieving the targeted path for money. To analyze the interest rate response to a money announcement during the post-October 1979 period it is necessary to note that the current week's funds rate, is no longer fixed. A positive money surprise indicates to market participants that the level of required reserves for the current settlement week will be higher than expected. This should lead to a higher funds rate in the remainder of the current week, which through the term structure equation (5), leads to a higher r. To explicitly model this additional effect, it is necessary to incorporate into the model a specification of the market for reserves.
Under lagged reserve accounting, the log of required reserves is given by = k + m2 (13) where k is the log of the required reserve ratio. For simplicity, it is assumed that all deposits are subject to the same reserve ratio and that the deposit to money ratio is constant. Assuming excess reserves are zero, equation (13) gives the demand for reserves.
The supply of reserves consists of nonborrowed reserves-taken to be the policy variable in the post-October 1979 period-and borrowed reserves.
A rise in the funds rate relative to the discount rate leads to a rise in bank borrowings and a fall in nonborrowed reserves as a fraction of total reserves. This relationship is specified as
where is the discount rate, and v is a mean zero, serially uncorrelated disturbance term.
To represent the determination of the policy variable in week t, assume lnNBR = lnNBR + where lnNBR is the (log) value of nonborrowed reserves consistent with achieving the target path for the money supply and is a transitory policy deviation from the target. Equation (7) replaces (7) in an analysis of the post-October 1979 period. Parallel with the treatment of the pre-October 1979 period, assume that at the beginning of week t, the public knows lnBR but not its decomposition into lnNBR and Under this operating procedure, the federal funds rate adjusts to equilibrate the reserve market. Equating the demand for reserves to the supply and solving for i yields
The response of the funds rate to the announcement can be shown to equal
A positive surprise (cr2 > 0) causes an upward revision in expected reserve demand over the remainder of the settlement week, leading to a rise in the funds rate.
To determine the impact under a reserves operating procedure of the announcement, equation (5) can be utilized, along with (16) to derive the response of the short-term interest rate:
One result is immediate from a comparison of (10), the pre-October 1979 effect, and (17), the post-October 1979 effect. For given values of a, p, A, and 5, the change in operating procedures introduces a new term, l/n > 0, into the response coefficient. A given money surprise has a larger effect on short-term interest rates under a nonborrowed reserves operating procedure than under a funds rate operating procedure. This is consistent with the increased response after October 1979 documented in Table 1 . From (12) and (17), however, it may be shown that the response of longer term (in-quarter) yields increases by only 1/m . 1/en. Thus, some other factors in the model must contribute to the increased response of long-term yields.
One possibility is that the change in operating procedures was viewed by the public as accompanied by a shift in the policy adjustment rule followed Another result of the change in operating procedures was a large increase in the volatility generally of interest rates. In Walsh (1982 Walsh ( , 1983 , it is -17-shown that a rise in the volatility of interest rates may lead to a fall in the interest elasticity of the demand for money which is proportional to the rise in volatility. Such a decline in as a consequence of the shift to a nonborrowed reserves operating procedure would also tend to increase the response of both short-and long-term yields to a given money surprise. The effects of changes in these various parameters are examined further using numerical examples in the fourth section.
III. pected Inflation Model
The model in the previous section, in order to focus on the policy anticipations effect, assumed that the expected rate of inflation remained constant in the face of the money announcement. This implies that the interest rate adjustments were adjustments in real interest rates. An alternative view of interest rate determination argues that real interest rates are independent of monetary influences so that any response of interest rates to a money announcement must be due to changes in the expected inflation premium incorporated in market rates. The present section develops a model of interest rate responses which attributes all changes in rates to changes in expected inflation.
If p is the constant ex ante real rate of interest and rt is, as before, the rate on an n-week security, then
16/ and n Is a mean zero disturbance term assumed to be serially where y = 5200-t uncorrelated.
In the model of section II, any deviation of the money stock from its target value leads to an adjustment in target levels but no change in the targeted long-run growth rate. This assumption needs to be modified to allow for the possibility that a value of m_2 above target leads the Federal Reserve to revise 
where use has been made of the fact that Pc_2 = E(m -mi(ti).
To understand the role of 2' suppose that the targeted growth rate is k and that = m2
+ (j+2)k. The actual growth rate from t-2 to t-l is estimated, at time t, to be k+ pc2. If this growth rate were to be maintained, the new target for m+. would be = E(m 1Ic2) + (j+1)k + (j+l)pc2 (ignoring A and for simplicity). If the deviation has no effect on the targeted growth rate, m+. = E(mt tt) + (j+1)k, which is the case considered in the previous section. Equation (2) allows a fraction t52 of the growth-rate deviation to have a permanent effect on the Federal Reserve's growth-rate target.
To determine the expected rate of inflation as a function of the underlying parameters of the model, it is first necessary to find the equilibrium solution for the log of the price level. From the money demand equation (3) and the Fisher equation (18):
Solving for p, equation (19) implies
Since ya/(n+ya) < 1, equation (20) 
The corresponding expression for a longer term (in quarter) security is given by
.. Table 1 within the context of the inflation expectations model, it is necessary to assume that there were shifts in the basic model parameters at the time of the change in operating procedures. For example, a rise in 62 the fraction of the week t-2 to t-l growth rate deviation which the Federal Reserve accommodates, would increase the response coefficients. Using numerical examples, the model is also compared to the estimated responses in the next section.
IV. Evaluation of the Models
In this section, the stylized models of the policy anticipations and the expected inflation effects are examined in terms of their consistency with the empirical results reported in Table 1 . While the models are specified under a variety of simplifying assumptions, they nevertheless embody the important features of the underlying hypotheses. Following the evaluation of the models, additional empirical evidence is presented on the persistence of announced money surprises.
In examining the consistency of the models with the estimated responses in Table 1 , iterative grid searches are performed over the models' parameters in both the pre-and post-October 1979 periods. In addition, the searches are implemented simultaneously for the 3-month (n=13), 1-year (m=4), 5-year (m=20), 10-year (m=40), and the 20-year (m=80) yields. For the policy anticipations model, the response of the 3-month yield is represented by (10) and (17) for the pre-and post-October 1979 periods, respectively. For longer term yields (m=4, 20, 40, 80), the response under both policy regimes is -21-given by (12). For the expected inflation model, the response of the 3-month yield is represented by (22) , and the response of longer term yields is given by (23). In each case, all parameters of the models--A, , p, and cS2 (when relevant)--are subjected to the grid search. The criterion used in the search is to minimize the sum of the absolute percentage differences from the point estimates in Table 1 The reported parameter values implied by the responses for the preOctober 1979 period suggest that weekly money demand disturbances are highly serially correlated (p = .986), and that they are eventually offset completely (6, = 0). The speed at which a money demand shock is offset, -22-however, is implausibly high. In particular, the value in Table 2 (A = .687)
implies that approximately 68 percent (A p cr2) of a surprise in announced money is offset during the week of the announcement. The responses are nevertheless quite insensitive to changes in the rate at which surprises are offset, as indicated by the third and fourth rows in Table 2 . In contrast, the fraction of the surprise accommodated has a larger impact on the responses, as indicated in the second row, where is increased to .100.
In the lower panel of Table 2 
Is the Expected Inflation Model Consistent with the Estimated Responses?
Analogous to Table 2 , the response of the term structure of interest rates under the expected inflation hypothesis is solved for selected parameter For the post-October 1979 period, the two main changes in the parameters are that 62 increases to .00256 and the interest-rate responsiveness of money demand is about one-half its previous value. As suggested by Cornell (1983) and Hardouvelis (1982) , the increase in 62 indicates greater accommodation of money surprises by the Federal Reserve through revisions in its target growth rate. In this case, the calculated value of 62 indicates that a 1 percent -24-money surprise leads to a revision in the target annualized money growth of .13 percentage points. Again, the 20-year yield's response of 14.6 basis points predominately reflects this accommodation. The eighth row in each panel also indicates the key role of this parameter.
Persistence of Money Surprises
The previous two subsections indicate that different sets of parameter values may be found that make both the policy anticipations and expected inflation hypotheses consistent with the estimated responses in Table 1 . Despite this inability to distinguish between the hypotheses on the basis of their consistency with the estimated responses, the implications of the models do differ dramatically. In particular, under the policy anticipations hypothesis, the parameter values indicate that money surprises are totally offset after some period of time. In contrast, under the expected inflation hypothesis, target growth rates are permanently changed in the direction of the surprise.
These different implications suggest one way in which the hypotheses may be distinguished. In particular, under the policy anticipations hypothesis, past surprises in the announced level of money would be expected to have diminishing effects on the level of the money stock over time. Under the expected inflation hypothesis, this should not be the case. Indeed, for money surprises to affect expected inflation over the maturity of a longterm security, surprises would be expected to persist over lengthy intervals.
The monetary policy rule specified previously (2) may be used to illustrate the possible relationship between past money surprises and the level of the money stock. In particular, recursive substitution yields (24) -25-where = + + Under the pure policy anticipations model, 62 = 0 so that as j becomes large, the coefficients on the lagged money surprises decline, approaching 61p asymptotically. In contrast, the inflation expectations model requires 62 > 0. In this case, equation (24) shows that as j becomes larger, the coefficients on the lagged money surprises must eventually start increasing with j. For the parameters reported in Table 3 for the post-October 1979 period, for example (A = .438, = .021, 62 = .00256), the coefficients are increasing for j 10.
Equation (24), therefore, suggests a simple means of discriminating between the policy anticipations hypothesis and the inflation expectations hypothesis. To examine the persistence of money surprises, the following empirical analogue of equation (24) is estimated: Table 4 . In each case, the equation is estimated without any constraints on the lag 20 / structure.-
The estimation results suggest that money surprises are offset within one year. In both periods, additional lag terms were included in the equations until the estimated coefficients appeared to remain around, or even below, zero.-' In the pre-October 1979 period, the unconstrained estimates become negative after 33 weeks. Similarly, estimated lag coefficients for the postOctober 1979 period become negative after 48 weeks. This empirical evidence, at least, casts strong doubt on the validity of the expected inflation hypothesis. 1. InitIal research on this topic also includes unpublished studies by Sivesarid (1978) and Conrad (1978). 2. Both of these studies are, of course, based on pre-October 1979 data.
Using post-October 1979 data, Makin (1982) finds that movements in nominal interest rates have been influenced more by changes in expected real rates than by expected inflation.
3. However, Cornell (1982) does not attribute these results to the policy anticipations effect. Also, Urich and Wachtel (1982) and Roley and Troll (1983) exanine the impact of unanticipated announced changes in the consumer (CPI) and producer (FF1) price indices on Treasury bill yields. Both studies find statistically Insignificant responses in the pre-October 1979 period, and Urich and Wachtel (1982) estimate a response to FF1 surprises which is significant at the 5 percent level in the October i979-June 1981 period. By extending the sample to October 1982, however, Roley and Troll (1983) fincf That the estimated response is again insignificant at the 10 percent level.
4. The excluded observations correspond to announcements of the CPI, the FF1, the unemployment rate, and industrial production. In the pre-October 1979 sample, 43 observations were excluded, while 22 were excluded in the post-October 1979 sample. 5. Announced changes in Mi-B are analyzed here because of the emphasis placed on Mi-B by Federal Reserve polIcyrnakers and market participants. It should also be noted that the Mi-B data for 1981 are not the shift-adjusted MI-B figures which reflect the introduction of nationwide NOW accounts. While the Federal Reserve's target range was in terms of shift-adjusted Mi-B, weekly announced changes were not shift adjusted.
6. As reported by in the context of the response of Treasury bill yields, specifying the surprise in terms of levels rather than changes has virtually no effect on the empirical results. For this paper, specifications were estimated with changes in the levels of interest rates, changes in the log of interest rates, and with money surprises in terms of announced changes, announced levels, and the log of announced levels. Again these alternative specifications yielded virtually the same results. We are Indebted to Raul A. Nicho, vice president with Money Market Services, for making the survey data available for this project.
7. In forming the revised expectation, the change in the 3-month bill yield from Tuesday at 3:30 p.m. to Friday at 3:30 p.m. is taken as a proxy for the receipt of all new information from the time of the survey to just before the money announcement. Regressing the announced change in money on the survey measure and this change in the bill yield indicates that this proxy is statistically significant at the 5 percent level [see ]. The rationality of the survey data is examined by Grossman (1981) for the preOctober 1979 period and by for the post-October 1979 period. These studies indicate that except for an additive bias in the pre-October 1979 period, usual hypotheses concerning the rationality of the expected money data used here cannot be rejected at low significance levels. For further analysis of these data, see Urich and Wachtel (1983) .
8.
In contrast to the other yield data used here, eral funds rate data provided by the Federal Reserve are in terms of daily averages. These data, however, predominately reflect federal funds trading before 3:30 p.m.
9. Following Urich and Wachtel (1981) and , more complicated specifications which disaggregated money surprises according to the relationship of money growth to its long-run policy ranges were also estimated. However, because of the larger standard errors of the equations estimated here due to the longer time interval over which the changes in rates were measured, the effects of policy ranges were not statistically significant for any of the yields in the post-October 1979 period. In the pre-October 1979 period, however, the effects of policy ranges were statistically significant in two instances, but only because of statistically significant coefficients with perverse signs. Also, the presence of statistically significant constant terms in some of the estimated equations in Table 1 may reflect measurement error in either the expected money data or the change in interest rates. Alternatively, they may reflect day-of-the-week effects [Gibbons and Hess (1981) ).
10. To avoid potential problems associated with heteroscedasticitY, the equations in each of the periods are weighted by the reciprocals of their estimated standard errors in the tests.
11. The role of the announcement in providing information on past money demand shifts is emphasized by Urich (1982) and Nichols, Small, and lebster (1983). 12. Equation (2) is similar to the policy rule used by Tinsley, von zur l'Iuehlen, and Fries (1982) , although they assume = 0.
13. McCallum and Hoehn (1983) analyze the optimal instrument choice in the context of lagged reserve accounting. For empirical evidence, see Sivesand and Hurley (1980) . 14. In a similar specification of a biweekly money demand equation, Urich (1982) assumes u is serially uncorrelated.
15. Equation (10) can be compared with the results of other authors. Urich (1982) assumes ct2 provides no information on and that 6-j 0. His expression for the announcement effect corresponds, therefore, only to the first term in (10). Nichols, Small, and Webster (1983) rely on an expected interest rate change in the money demand equation to motivate future expectations affecting current interest rates. They also assume m is the policy instrument of the Federal Reserve and that ni2 -E(m reveals information on the net shock to both money supply and money emand during week t-2. However, under lagged reserve accounting, the major shocks generating week-to-week fluctuations in the money stock arise from the demand for money as modeled here.
16. In the empirical work, interest rates are measured in basis points at annual rates. This makes it necessary to multiply an n-week rate of change such as t+n -Pt by 5200.
17. For computational convenience, certain limitations were placed on the number of digits taken by the parameters. In particular, A, , and p were restricted to three decimal points, and three nonzero digits were found for and 62. All parameters were restricted to take values between zero and one.
18. The increased interest-rate volatility in the post-October 1979 period coinciding with the change in operating procedures is capable of explaining this fall in interest elasticity in the model presented by Walsh (1982 Walsh ( , 1983 . In addition, this elasticity may have declined due to increased financial innovation and deregulation, which may not be totally independent of the rise in volatility. See, for example, Lindsey (1977) and Niehans (1982) .
19. Note that a proxy for is not needed in (24') since the money surprises t-j-2 (j=0,...,k-1) are, under rational expectations, uncorrelated with this variable. The proxy was instead included to reduce heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. In this model, as is common in many rational expectations models, standard serial correlation correction procedures would result in inconsistent coefficient estimates. In contrast, OLS estimation yields consistent coefficient estimates in this case, but potentially inconsistent estimated standard errors.
20. Polynomial lags were also estimated, and they yielded virtually the same qualitative results. Table 4 suggested that the estimated coefficients do not once again increase. Furthermore, lagged money surprises were entered separately on the right-hand side of (24 ) (i.e., c1 = 0 (ij), c 0) and the estimation results were comparable to those reported in the table.
Extending both lags beyond the lengths reported in
This appendix contains a more detailed derivation of the results reported in sections II and III.
Policy Anticipations Model
From the term structure relationship equation (5), = (l/n)i + (1/n) E E(i+.J) (A.1) since, from (7), E(i+.lt) = E(i+).
Using the fact that (l/n)ZE(i÷1k) = -(1/n) E(i+I), equation (A.l) can be manipulated to eliminate the future federal funds rates, yielding rt = (l/n)i + j!O E(r÷+i '÷+' + ((n_l)/n)E(rI) (A.2) where it is assumed that E(+c,jt) = E(r÷1).
The target values of r÷.
are found by using the money demand equation (3) To evaluate each of these terms, note that equation (2) implies, since br and- 
